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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
In its simplest form the patent system is designed to encourage the disclosure of 
innovative thought in exchange for a period of exclusivity in which the grantee of the 
rights may profit from such knowledge. 
I will attempt in this paper to show that patentees seeking to enforce their patents in 
Australia will face great difficulty through a number of potentially fatal pitfalls. I also 
submit that as a result of the decisions in Australia in reported patent cases in the 
last ten years, legal advisers should place their clients on notice that if they are trying 
to enforce their patents they are unlikely to succeed.  
This may mean a severe reality check to the expectations of patentees.  
Although statistically local patentees are in the minority1 the importance of the 
contribution to innovation in this country of small to medium businesses within that 
class has been recognised by the government.2 It is only fair and just that if people 
are to be encouraged to spend time and money to innovate that there be a 
reasonable level of predictability that their efforts will be protected.   
The current situation presents, in my opinion, a very real dilemma for practitioners. 
On the one hand innovation is being encouraged through a system of reward by 
exclusive rights, while on the other these rights are unlikely to be upheld.  
In this paper I identify three major hurdles for patentees. Firstly, is the “invention” 
entitled to a grant of patent? Secondly, will the formal document setting out the 
claimed invention survive technical scrutiny by the Court?3 Thirdly, assuming the 
integrity of the patent is upheld, how will the court interpret the claim in order to 
identify if there has been an infringement? 
T H E  P R O B L E M  
Of fifty-nine cases determined (including appeals) between the period October 1990 
and October 1999, fifty-three were decided by the Federal Court, five by the 
Supreme Courts of Victoria and New South Wales, and one in the High Court.4 Of 
these fifty-nine cases, twelve or 20% of the applicants were successful in upholding 
the patent and going on to a finding of infringement.  
Even less favourable results than the 20% success rate referred to above have been 
calculated in respect of hearings for the period 30 April 1991 and 31 December 1997. 
Of the fifty-six reported judgments in patent infringement cases heard in the Federal 
  
 
Court in that period, fifty-five or 98%, were in favour of the alleged infringer and only 
one in favour of a patentee.5 The Federal Court reversed even that single decision in 
favour of the patentee on appeal.6 
Interestingly, of the five cases dealt with by the Supreme Courts of Victoria and New 
South Wales, four decisions7 or 80% upheld validity of the patent in suit and went on 
to find infringement. In the 5th decision where the patent was revoked the applicant 
was permitted to amend the specification and following such amendment the court 
found the patent valid and that the defendant had infringed the patent.8 In respect of 
two of the five decisions where claims made by the patent were upheld and led to 
infringement, the patent was revoked on appeal to the Federal Court.9  
These figures are a far cry from an approval rating of 50%, which the Working Group 
anticipated would be expected under win/lose outcomes, bearing in mind that 10% of 
matters litigated proceeded to trial.10 Litigation in the Federal Court accounts for 
approximately 0.03 – 0.04% of the registered IP rights.11 
As submitted recently by several commentators, “users of the patent system in 
Australia may well ponder negatively on the recent judicial record of patent cases in 
Australia.”12 
Coupled with this difficulty facing patentees, the average cost to prosecute a patent 
infringement action has been estimated at $250,000.00. Notwithstanding these 
factors, an additional dilemma for the patentee is that they bear the onus of proving 
their cases on validity and infringement without any presumption in their favour that 
the patent is by its grant valid.13 
The Working Group on Managing Intellectual Property has considered that it may be 
desirable to conduct a study of the decision record of the Australian courts, which 
would involve an investigation of the outcome of every reported decision in which 
validity or the infringement of a patent was at issue. This was obviously more viable 
than subjecting all the evidence of these cases to an independent objective 
assessment to determine if the Patents Office or the Court was in error.14  
 
 
 
  
 
T H E  S T A T U T O R Y  P O S I T I O N  –  T H E  P A T E N T S  A C T  
The patent regime in Australia is governed by Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (the “Act”). 
WHAT IS A PATENT? 
Presently, a patent is defined as a standard patent or a petty patent.15 A patent is a 
temporary monopoly granted by the Crown to the patentee in return for the disclosure 
of information to the public in the patent specification. 
WHAT RIGHTS FLOW FROM THE GRANT? 
Subject to the provisions of the Act, a patent gives the patentee exclusive rights, 
during the term of the patent, to exploit the invention.16 
These exclusive rights are personal property and generally, the person entitled to the 
benefits flowing from the grant of patent are the inventor or the person or persons 
entitled to have the patent assigned to them.17 In Australia, a person who 
independently invents something can claim to be the inventor if that person is the first 
to file an application. 
INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE ACT 
Neither the Act nor its predecessor, the Patents Act 1952 (Cth), contain a definition of 
infringement. A person who, without the licence of the patentee, does an act within a 
valid claim of the patent, infringes the patentee’s rights.18  
It is usual and in fact empowered by the Act, that the defendant in infringement 
proceedings may apply by way of counter-claim in the proceedings, for the 
revocation of the patent and that the provisions in relation to revocation of the patent 
apply with the necessary changes to the cross-claim.19 In the last ten years there has 
not been a case reported where the respondent has not put the validity of the patent 
in issue by cross-claim. 
VALIDITY UNDER THE ACT 
The validity of the patent is dealt with in Chapter 2 Part 3 of the Act.  
As to its content 
An “invention” is patentable if it satisfies the requirements of section 18(1) of the Act 
which requires that a “patentable invention” is an invention that: 
  
 
 is a manner of manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies20; and 
 when compared with the prior art base as it existed before the priority date of that 
claim: 
−  is novel; and  
− involves an inventive step; and 
 is useful; and 
 was not secretly used in Australia before the priority date by the patentee, their 
agent or predecessor in title.21 
Simply because a patent is granted does not give rise to a presumption that it is 
valid. In fact, the Act specifically excludes the guarantee of the grant, or that a patent 
is valid.22 In Australia there is presently no presumption of validity. The Act relevantly 
provides: 
“Validity of patent not guaranteed 
20 (1) Nothing done under this Act or the PCT 
guarantees the granting of a patent, or that a patent is 
valid, in Australia or anywhere else.” 
 
As to its form 
In addition to the attacks on the entitlement of an invention to a grant of patent based 
on elements of novelty, inventive step, utility and manner of new manufacture, the 
cases have shown that many patents are revoked on technical grounds even before 
the questions of infringement are considered.  
It has long been entrenched in patent law that as patents were an exception to the 
legislation that prohibited monopolies, the terms of the claimed monopoly must be 
clear and that full disclosure be made.23 
In general terms a provisional specification must describe the invention and a 
complete specification must:  
 describe the invention fully, including the best method known to the applicant of 
performing the invention; and  
  
 
 end with a claim or claims defining the invention in relation to a standard patent.      
In addition the claim or claims must be clear and succinct and fairly based on the 
matter described in the specification and must relate to one invention only.24 
 DEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE 
Located on the web-site for IP Australia under the heading “IP Strategies for Your 
Business” the following comment is made: 
“Ownership of IP rights is the legal recognition you receive for 
your creative effort. It gives you the right to fully exploit your IP – 
to own, sell, licence or bequeath your IP in much the same way 
as you can with real estate.”25 
It would be surprising if the unsuccessful patentees (80%) of the last ten years would 
wholly agree with this statement. The cases have shown that patents are quite 
defeasible. 
V A L I D I T Y  O F  P A T E N T S  
MANNER OF MANUFACTURE 
Uncertainty has been manifest by the reversal by the High Court of the Federal Court 
decision of Ramset Fasteners (Australia) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty 
Ltd that the Court was not confined to the body of the specification when determining 
if the invention at issue was a manner of new manufacture. As this decision involved 
the Patents Act 1952 there was uncertainty as to whether the Court was so limited to 
the body of the specification under the 1990 Act.  
The case of NV Philips Gloeilampenfabriken & Anor v Mirabella International Pty 
Ltd26 introduced a new requirement for “inventiveness” or “newness” over and above 
the tests for novelty or inventive step. 
LACK OF INVENTIVE STEP OR OBVIOUSNESS. 
The question of obviousness as a ground of objection presents a large obstacle for 
the patentee. It has been said: 
 
“What is obvious cannot be inventive and what is inventive 
cannot be obvious…”27 
  
 
A patent would be obvious it has been said if it was shown that it would appear to 
anyone skilled in the art but lacking in inventive capacity, that to try the step or 
process would be worthwhile28.  
Despite a warning against hindsight,29 there is the obvious difficulty that inventions in 
hindsight appear obvious. This is particularly so when a new result has been found 
from known integers. Many cases determined are based on the evidence of experts 
retained by the parties. Such evidence for the respondents invariably is that the 
invention was obvious to the skilled addressee and lacked any inventive step. 
NOVELTY OR ANTICIPATION 
To decide whether something is novel, one must assess the invention against the 
prior art base. Information must be in the public domain. The terms “anticipated”, 
“prior published” or “prior disclosed” are used in this area with the term “lacks 
novelty”. 
The question is whether there had been prior publication and whether the information 
had been communicated to any member of the public in a way that left him or her 
free to do what he or she liked with the information.30 The prior disclosure must allow 
a person of ordinary knowledge of the subject area to apply the discovery without the 
need for further experimentation.31 
In theory, in Australia it should be easier for the patentee to overcome this ground of 
objection to validity because in Australia “mosaicing” is not permitted. The general 
rule is that for the purpose of assessing novelty each document must be read 
separately and it is not possible to piece documents together as a “mosaic” to make 
up an anticipated disclosure.32  
However the Court went on to say that this mosaic was not totally out of the question 
where a skilled addressee would treat two or more prior related documents or related 
acts as a single source of information.33 Uncertainty arises in determining whether a 
Court will determine whether it believes a skilled addressee would combine the two 
disclosures to make a single source of information.  
In Nomad Structures International Ltd v Heyring Pty Ltd, the delegate determined 
that in certain circumstances it may be permitted to consider the novelty or 
obviousness of a claimed invention against a combination of prior uses and that the 
test should be less stringent when considering uses as opposed to documents.34  
  
 
THE CLAIMS AND SPECIFICATIONS  
The proper preparation of specifications and claims in relation to an invention 
impacts on the chances of success of the patent in either infringement actions or 
questions as to the validity of a patent. Section 40(3) of the Act emphasises the need 
for clarity in the claim.   
Ambiguity may be fatal to the validity of the patent. After referring to a difficulty in 
ascertaining certain dimensions Luxmoore J said in No-Fume Ltd v Frank Pitchford & 
Co Ltd: 
“If there is any materiality in this relationship it seems to be 
essential to the validity of the patent that its nature should be 
defined in unambiguous terms and cannot be left to choice, the 
accuracy or inaccuracy of which, from the point of view of 
infringement, can only be determined by actual experiment with 
the completed article.”35 
In Australian Solar Mesh Sales36, the appellant in the proceedings was the applicant 
for a patent and the proprietor of a petty patent in respect of a fine fibre glass mesh.  
The appellant claimed that the respondent had infringed its petty patent by 
manufacturing a similar mesh product.  The respondent/manufacturer challenged the 
validity of the petty patent on a number of grounds.   
Relevantly, one ground of challenge depended on the rule that a patentee must state 
clearly and distinctly the nature and limits of the claimed monopoly.  Specifically, 
what was meant by the term “very similar” in relation to the word “grey”?  Did that 
reference mean a light grey or a dark grey, as distinct from a medium grey?  Or did it 
refer to something which was not grey but which had some tonal similarity, such as 
blue?  The Court considered there was merit in the respondents’ argument about the 
ambiguity of the colour specification.   
In addition, there was a further ambiguity claimed by the respondents in that the word 
“diameter” of the yarn was to be a particular measurement.  Expert evidence was 
given to the effect that the fibreglass yarn used in the mesh was originally round, 
however, the hot weaving process through which the mesh was passed flattened the 
yarn and made the term “diameter” inappropriate in that “diameter” was a term 
referable to a round object.  
The experts agreed that their use of the term “diameter” was not accurate for the 
yarn in its post-manufactured state.  The Court held that due to the ambiguity in the 
colour description contained in the claim, and further by the ambiguity of the term 
  
 
“diameter” in relation to the yarn in is post-manufactured state, the petty patent was 
invalid and liable to revocation.   
The importance of clarity and succinct description of the claim is further highlighted 
by a presumption, noted by Murphy J of the High Court in the case Australian Paper 
Manufacturers Limited v C.I.L. Inc., where his Honour stated: 
“It is a reasonable principle of interpretation that where an Act 
which grants monopoly rights is ambiguous, the ambiguity 
(whether relating to substance or procedure) should be resolved 
in favour of the public and against the extension of monopoly”.37 
Ambiguity in a claim will usually prompt an examination of the specification for 
clarification of the ambiguity.38  
There appears to be recognition that the specifications should be considered as a 
whole and not just in a literal sense.39 It has been held that the reading of the 
specifications is only necessary where clarification of the meaning of the claims is 
required.40 In order to be granted a patent, a discovery must have a practical 
application of some benefit to the public41.  
I N F R I N G E M E N T  –  “ L I T E R A L ”  V  “ P U R P O S I V E ”  
If the patent survives these hurdles, the question arises whether the respondent has 
infringed the patent.  
The most restrictive method of interpreting claims for the purpose of infringement is 
the “literal” or “textual” tests. According to this approach infringement occurs only 
where the respondent’s process contains all the integers of the invention.  
A purposive approach to the interpretation of the claims, as stated in Catnic 
Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd42 is clearly applied in Australia.43. This approach 
seeks to determine what the patentee’s purpose was in using particular words and 
phrases to describe the claim in the terms used in the patent. This has been 
described as being a broader approach more favourable to patentees.44  
In addition it is clear law that all of the essential integers have to be taken to 
constitute infringement.45 Put another way the substance or the alleged infringer 
should take the “pith and marrow”.46 
In Catnic Lord Diplock said at p242-243: 
  
 
“…It is those novel features only that he claims to be essential 
that constitute the so-called “pith and marrow” of the claim. A 
patent specification should be given a purposive construction 
rather than purely literal one derived from applying to it the kind 
of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often 
tempted by their training to indulge…” 
The purposive test however has been applied conservatively. In Populin v HB 
Nominees Pty Ltd47 the Full Court of the Federal Court cited Catnic with approval but 
the “purposive” test of Lord Diplock was seen as just determining the claim’s 
meaning or the applicant’s purpose in the claim rather than an alternate test.  
The patent in Populin concerned a sugar cane planting machine, which used a 
conveyor belt to move the cane billets from a storage container to a small supply bin. 
The billets were then lined up for planting within the supply bin. The respondent’s 
machine used a similar mechanism but utilised one bin, not two.  
Even though the “purposive” approach was applied infringement was not found 
because the use of 1 bin not 2 was an essential integer of the invention.  
The Court affirmed that there is no infringement if all of the essential features are not 
taken. The uncertainty for patentees and their advisers is to anticipate what the court 
will determine are the essential features of the claim.  
In Populin one might have thought the use of one bin not two was not an essential 
integer as both had the purpose of storage, however that was not the case.  
C A S E  S T U D I E S  
The following are some examples of the difficulties facing patentees. It is an uphill 
battle even trying to resist the attacks on validity, before a patentee may even 
consider the infringement issue. 
Elconnex Pty Ltd v Gerard Industries Pty Ltd48 
In Elconnex Pty Ltd v Gerard Industries Pty Ltd the applicant (“Elconnex”) was the 
grantee of a petty patent for a corrugated plastic pipe connector for use with plastic 
conduit carrying electrical wiring.  This connector (the “Elconnex Connector”) offered 
a push on snap fitting and sealing device, making the connection watertight.   
The applicant also obtained registration pursuant to the Designs Act 1906.   
The respondent (“Gerard”) was the largest supplier of electrical fittings in Australia.  
After the launch of the Elconnex Connector, the respondent developed its own 
  
 
connector (the Clipsole Connector).  It did so by deliberately copying the Elconnex 
Connector, making changes to some of its features to disguise its action.  
Elconnex brought action for patent and design infringement and under s.52 of the 
Trade Practice Act as the Clipsole Connector bore the words “Pat Pend” in 
circumstance where they had not applied for a patent, and represented that the 
connectors were reasonably fit to use with corrugated plastic conduit to carry 
electrical wiring, when those connectors failed to pass the test known as the “pull out 
test”, as required by the Australian standard.   
Elconnex provides an excellent example of market share strategy. It was said by 
Burchett J:  
“The concept of the Elconnex Connector clearly had 
considerable appeal.  On the day after it was exhibited, the 
respondent, Gerard (which is the largest supplier of electrical 
fittings in Australia) set about the production of a copy. The 
evidence of that is conclusive.  An Elconnex Connector was 
dismembered in order to use a vital part of it in the fabrication of 
a prototype.  Some changes were made and one of the 
questions that had to be decided by the Court was whether the 
changes were sufficient to avoid liability in respect of the 
applicant’s registered design”49.  
I submit that it is reasonable to conclude that the fact that the largest competitor 
jumped on to the product so quickly, would be strong evidence that the “invention” 
was in response to a long felt want in the industry and not obvious.50 This was not the 
case. 
In this case, Gerard attacked validity by cross-claiming that: 
 The claim of the petty patent was not fairly based on matter disclosed in the 
complete specification; 
 The alleged “invention” lacked inventive step or was obvious;   
 The alleged invention lacked novelty; and 
 The terms of the petty patent specification were ambiguous.   
His Honour accepted the expert evidence given in support of the respondent’s 
argument that the connector described in the petty patent would have been no more 
than a routine variation of well known connector principles and examples.51  
  
 
His Honour found that the only significant features of the petty patent were matters of 
which a skilled addressee would have been aware. Also the use of a thin walled 
section to achieve flexibility was an inevitable empirical consequence.  
It was held that the alleged invention was obvious, as it was simply the application of 
well-known and well-understood matters to an analogous use. The decision of the 
Trial Judge was upheld on appeal. 
In relation to infringement his Honour adopted “a practical commonsense approach” 
which looked to the ordinary use of the product. His Honour found that if the petty 
patent had survived on the issue of validity the respondent would have infringed the 
patent.52 
MJA Scientifics International Pty Ltd v S C Johnson & Son Pty Ltd53 
In this matter the patentee was a company incorporated in Australia and the 
respondent was a subsidiary of S C Johnson in the United States. MJA was the 
patentee for an invention entitled “pesticidal sheets or containers”. These were, in 
general terms, cardboard sheets which had been passed through a printing machine 
which contained predominantly a mixture of ink and pesticide, the result being a 
cardboard “mat” printed with ink containing pesticide. 
The respondent (SCJ) had produced a similar product by coating a cardboard “mat” 
which had already been printed with ink, through a coating process using a printing 
machine. 
MJA claimed SCJ had infringed the patent by manufacturing and selling in Australia 
cockroach insecticide mats made in accordance with the patented method. 
SCJ denied infringement and cross-claimed for revocation on the ground that the 
invention was not novel at the priority date when compared with the prior art. SCJ 
relied on a United Kingdom patent of ICI to destroy the novelty of the MJA patent. 
The trial judge determined that there were three essential integers to the MJA 
claims.54 His Honour determined that the ICI patent expressly disclosed the first two 
integers and the third (which was drying the dispersed mixture after printing), 
although not mentioned in the ICI patent, would have been known by the skilled 
addressee to have been required to have been done. 
In relation to infringement his Honour stated the established position that: 
  
 
 a respondent would not escape infringement by adopting immaterial variations by  
omitting an inessential part and substituting it;55 
 infringement will not be dependant on verbal accuracy of the claim but on 
whether the substantial idea disclosed by the specification has been taken.56 
 All the essential integers must be taken to constitute infringement.57 
Bearing these principles in mind, his Honour applied the considerations used in 
determining the construction of the claim for revocation purposes and the knowledge 
attributed to the skilled addressee to apply the infringement test.58 In doing so his 
Honour found the pesticide was not dispersed as stated in the claim nor was ink 
used. As two integers were not copied there was no infringement.  
It seems clear from the decision that the Court (approves as legitimate commercial 
behaviour) commercial activity aimed at circumventing a patent. His Honour 
Sundberg J said in the context of considering additional damages for copyright 
infringement: 
“I was referred to internal SCJ memoranda and communications 
with its patent attorneys and other advisers disclosing SCJ’s 
discovery of MJA’s success with its Dead End product, SCJ’s 
decision to enter the cockroach mat market, SCJ’s concern about 
possible patent difficulties, and its patent attorney’s advice about 
manufacturing an SCJ product which would not infringe the 
patent. None of the documents relied on relates to the copyright 
issues. They disclose an interest in developing a rival product in 
what appeared to be a developing market, a realisation that the 
patent meant that SCJ could not just copy MJA’s product but 
would need to manufacture its own product in a different way so 
as not to infringe the patent, and a belief based on expert advice, 
correct as it turned out, that this could be done. That seems to 
me to be legitimate commercial behaviour.”59 
It is interesting to note that the SCJ product sought registration of its product with the 
National Registration Authority on the basis that its product was substantially the 
same as the patentee’s or known in the industry as an “image registration.” 
Dyno Nobel Inc v Orica Australia Pty Ltd (formerly ICI Australia Proprietary 
Limited)60 
In this case the patent claimed: 
 a method of blasting; 
 the blasting being limited to blasting in reactive ores; 
  
 
 a method using urea in relation to blasting activities. 
The patentee and exclusive licensee sought a declaration that the respondent had 
infringed the patent and the respondent cross-claimed for revocation. The judgment 
dealt only with validity – which was not found – making infringement unnecessary to 
determine. 
The respondent claimed the alleged invention:61  
 was not a patentable invention within s6 of the Statute of Monopolies; 
 lacked novelty; 
 did not disclose an inventive step. 
His Honour considered at length the issue of manner of manufacture and in particular 
the construction of s18(1) of the Act relating to the manner of manufacture. The Trial 
Judge determined the case came within the High Court decisions of Advanced 
Building Systems Pty Ltd v Ramsett Fasteners Aust Pty Ltd62 (which was concerned 
with the 1952 Act) and the High Court decision in NV Philips Gloeilampenfabriken & 
Anor v Mirabella International Pty Ltd,63 which dealt with the 1990 Act. 
Philips determined that the construction of the opening words of s18(1) of the Act, 
namely “a patentable invention is an invention that”, created a threshold requirement 
of “newness” or “inventiveness” distinct from the issue of novelty or obviousness. 64 
His Honour Dowsett J considered that in applying Philips one must focus on the 
meaning of the specification and the material relevant to that issue.65 In doing so his 
Honour found that the patent did not disclose a manner of manufacture within the 
meaning of s6 of the Statute of Monopolies.  
In addition, the claimed invention did not involve an inventive step and it was 
anticipated (not novel). In the light of these findings, his Honour did not proceed 
further to consider the technical question of whether the specification fully described 
the invention or whether it lacked utility. 
This presents a further uncertainty for patentees. The High Court determined that, if 
on the face of the specification there was no quality of inventiveness necessary for a 
grant under the Statute of Monopolies, it was not necessary to even consider the 
prior art question if the invention did not survive the threshold test under s18(1) of the 
Act.  
  
 
Consider the different legal interpretation of scientific data in the Full Court of the 
Federal Court decision in Philips. The Court upheld a decision revoking the patent on 
the grounds that as a matter of construction of the specification that the patentee had 
claimed characteristics of known phosphors and claiming a monopoly in all lamps 
using those characteristics: 
“I accept the correctness of the submission of counsel for the 
respondent that what the patentee has done in this case is to 
choose two desirable characteristics of the known  phosphors 
and to claim lamps using all phosphors, present and future, 
possessing those characteristics.”66 
The difficulty in predicting an outcome is shown by the dissenting judgment of 
Burchett J who said that the invention was a particular kind of lamp comprising 
luminescent materials having particular requirements, rather than in the phosphors 
themselves.67  
General Clutch Corporation v Sbriggs68 
As stated69 the majority of patent owners are overseas entities where patents are 
filed through conventions. Consequently terms used in other countries may carry 
differing connotations.   
In General Clutch the Court had to consider the meaning of the term “comprising” at 
length to determine if there was infringement. 
The applicant was a US corporation and the registered proprietor of an Australian 
patent for “improvements in spring clutches”. The patent contained 8 claims, but the 
applicant relied only on claim 1. Relevantly Claim 1 and claims 4 and 6 (which were 
referred to but not relied on) stated: 
“1. A spring clutch comprising a first shaft…”; 
“4. A spring clutch comprising a first element…”; 
“6. A bi-directional spring clutch comprising an input element...”. 
The respondent simply said that the word “comprising” is an exclusive term meaning, 
“consisting only” of what followed the word. These were the essential integers of the 
claim. If that were not so, the respondent said Claim 1 would claim “any spring clutch 
made from a combination of integers which includes, but is not necessarily limited to, 
the integers in Claim1.” If that were the case the respondent said the patent would be 
invalid under s40 of the Act as it would fail to define the invention (s40 (2)(b)), would 
not be clear and succinct (s40 (3)) and would not be fairly based.  
  
 
The applicant contended that the term “comprising” meant “includes” and that what 
followed was not a closed class of integers, as a spring clutch was not the claimed 
invention, but rather a spring clutch with the features identified in claim 1. The 
respondent’s product contained a third shaft and the respondent argued that as the 
word “comprising” represented a closed class of integers, which referred to two 
shafts, there could be no infringement.70  
His Honour O'Loughlin J held that infringement required that each of the essential 
elements of the combination the subject of the Patent be taken, and his Honour 
considered that the device challenged lacked two of the integers found in the relevant 
claim in the case before him.  
C O N C L U S I O N S  
The facts of each case present different emphases on the grounds the alleged 
infringer attacked validity. That there will be an attack is most probable. The alleged 
infringers in patent enforcement cases in the last ten years have all attacked the 
patent on one or more grounds. 
The Court relies on technical experts in relation to a number of issues. These clearly 
would be at least on these matters: 
 whether the specification indicates on its face that the patent is a manner of 
manufacture with s6 of the Statute of Monopolies; 
 whether a non-inventive skilled addressee would be aware of the inventive 
elements claimed in the patent; 
 whether prior art anticipates the claimed invention; 
 whether several acts or publications can be joined together to form sufficient prior 
disclosure to anticipate the claimed invention; 
 whether the claims are fairly based; 
 whether the terms are ambiguous. 
In addition, it is clear that all the essential integers must be taken to constitute 
infringement. Assuming a patent survives the attack on integrity, the determination of 
what are the essential integers of a claim are discretionary and make predicability of 
an outcome on infringement even more difficult. 
  
 
O B S E R V A T I O N S  
ABUSE OF PRIVILEGE  
There may be concern that as the majority of patents in Australia are owned by 
overseas interests that strengthening patents may not be in the interests of local 
consumers as it is anticipated that prices would not be able to be controlled. The 
poor success rate of patents in Australia in the last ten years may have resulted from 
an apprehension of the Federal Court that the public may suffer as a result of high 
prices for patented products. 
Firstly, the Commonwealth has the power to exploit for itself an invention at any time 
after it is applied for.71 
Alternatively, The Commonwealth may apply to the Court for an order revoking a 
patent.72 One ground may be that the invention is not a “patentable invention” as it is 
mischievous to the State within the meaning of s6 of the Statute of Monopolies.73 
This may be invoked where the product or process is so vital or anticipated to be so 
vital to the community that the public in general would unnecessarily suffer as a 
result of the monopoly granted. However comment anticipates that this is not likely. 
The Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee has said: 
“In practice, however, a patent holder can rarely act as a pure 
monopoly, because of the availability of alternate and substitute 
products and processes, and also because some scope for 
imitation almost always exists.” 74 
The National Competition Council expresses similar comments, “Review of s51(2) 
and 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974”, Final Report, March 1999: 
“The Council regarded IP rights as exclusive property rights like 
any other, rather than legal or economic monopolies, and did not 
consider there to be any clash between IP rights and competition 
law. The Council considered there would only be rare cases 
where holders or users of IP rights would have sufficient market 
power to raise competition law issues, because generally there 
are viable substitute products or processes available from 
competing IP.”75 
 
  
 
MARKET SHARE 
His Honour Drummond J76 makes the point that there may be a use of patents, which 
is not a reward by the community for disclosure of information but rather a tool to 
block or seize market share.  
Respectfully, I submit that the cases of Elconnex and MJA are examples of an 
equally prevalent “misuse”. In those cases a stronger competitor has reverse 
engineered a product to seize or secure a market share in their particular products or 
line of products. So used, disclosed information is not used by competitors to 
advance the level of knowledge and provide an improved product to the benefit of the 
public, but is used as a marketing tool. 
The application of the well-known phrase in copyright law, “if it’s worth copying, it’s 
worth protecting”, seems to have little relevance in patent law.  
THE INFRINGEMENT TEST 
The consideration of the Court as to what are the “essential features” creates 
difficulties in advising on patent infringement. What the patentee may not regard as 
essential, may be determined differently by the Court. As all essential integers must 
be taken to effect infringement, the absence from the alleged infringing product or 
process of what the patentee regarded as non-essential will amount to non-
infringement.  
Is the Court merely “culling” the weak patents?  
If the level of scrutiny of applications by IP Australia is relatively low, this may 
account for the poor performance of patents under Court scrutiny. However, the 
Court has considered this to be the preferable position.  
In Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Limited it was said77: 
“It is well settled that the Commissioner ought not to refuse 
acceptance of an application and specifications unless it appears 
practically certain that letters patent granted on the specifications 
would be held invalid.” 
The Court went on to say: 
“Moreover, whereas refusal of acceptance is final, acceptance is 
not… and if a patent is granted, its validity is open to attack in 
proceedings for infringement or for revocation.”78 
  
 
The merits of a patent will not be scrutinised if there have been no opposition 
proceedings unless, and until, they come before the Court.  As revocation 
proceedings are usually instigated as a cross-claim, it is crucial for the patentee, at 
the time of the grant, to have some indication that the grant reflects some merit.   
INHERENT DIFFICULTIES 
Our patent system is based on a first to file system rather than the first to invent. If a 
person independent of the applicant has invented something before the applicant, yet 
does not file before the applicant, subject of course to prior public disclosure issues, 
the earlier inventor will miss out. 
The system inherently promotes the urgent filing of a provisional or complete 
specification to claim priority. Further, the quality of the claims or specifications may 
be compromised in the provisional specification where as is often the case the 
applicant is anxious to “launch” the product or method and requires the urgent 
preparation of complex documents.  
Section 40 of the Act provides that the complete specification must not and cannot go 
beyond the parameters set by the provisional and must “describe the invention fully, 
including the best method known by the applicant of performing the invention.” 
Difficulties arise when in the twelve months following the filing of the provisional 
specifications, further research may reveal a better method or unrealised integers. 
Cramming those expansions into the original description made in the provisional 
specifications may be difficult and may give rise to fair basing issues.  
It may be said that further applications may be made if it is felt that the new 
discoveries do not come within the original disclosure. However, I submit firstly that 
this is not always clear and further that this will be for the ultimate determination of 
the Court and therefore may be uncertain. 
Further there may be competitors making those further discoveries themselves from 
the original public disclosure where the product is exposed to the market in the 
interim period before grant. 
The problem may be alleviated by the recommended period of grace of six months 
for public disclosure affecting the prior art base for novelty and inventive step.79  
  
 
SUGGESTIONS 
Introduction Of A Presumption That Patents Are Valid 
As stated above there is no presumption of validity in Australia.80  
It would seem logical that if a presumption of validity was introduced this may act as 
a deterrent to potential infringers as this would involve a higher level of scrutiny by IP 
Australia.81 
The presumption would not guarantee validity but would shift the onus presently on 
the applicant to the alleged infringer. The shift alone will not of itself give rise to a 
greater number of patents enforced. The presumption must be accompanied by 
greater scrutiny before grant. The Court should presume technical experts who 
consider the material patentable have at least reviewed the patent. 
The Advisory Council on Industrial Property has stated that a presumption can only 
be made where there is “vigorous screening” before grant.82  
The Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee’s Interim Report of 
March, 2000 agreed with the recommendation that a pre-requisite for such a 
presumption would have to be a higher screening process before the grant of a 
patent83.  
The Record of Proceedings of the Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights, held in 
February 1998, notes the following responses from the participants: 
“The level of the presumption of validity of Australian patents is a 
major concern held by most participants. Many people who 
obtain an IP right believe they own a valid right – only to discover 
when they try to take action against an infringer that this may not 
be the case.”84 
And further, whilst recognising that such a presumption may make it more difficult to 
obtain an IP right, the presumption of validity would remove much of the element of 
doubt for an IP right owner taking infringement action.85 
Experts 
As the Courts place a great deal of reliance on the testimony of experts these should 
be appointed independently of the parties. Whilst this will increase costs “upfront” in 
litigation, as the experts will be paid as they carry out work, their objective testimony 
may assist patentees. It should also eliminate the problem of myopic hindsight. 
  
 
As our Courts in this area rely heavily on the evidence of experts to explain the 
technology involved, I find the approach of one Canadian judge refreshing. On the 
question of obviousness it was said: 
“Every invention is obvious after it is made, and to no one more 
than an expert in the field. Where the expert has been hired for 
the purpose of testifying, his infallible hindsight is even more 
suspect. It is so easy, once the teaching of a patent is known, to 
say ‘I could have done that’: before the assertion can be given 
any weight, one must have a satisfactory answer to the question 
‘why didn’t you?’.”86 
An independent expert might eliminate the practice of having the attorney who 
drafted the patent defending it at trial. From the early advice stage an objective view 
should be taken on prospects.  
Amendments to Patents 
The practice of amending patents should be explored and utilised more often. 
In Pracdes Pty Limited v Stanilite Electronics Pty Ltd87 his Honour Windeyer J 
ordered that the patent be amended by substituting for the words and thereby largely 
avoid the above disadvantages” with the words “and thereby largely avoid most, if not 
all, of the above disadvantages.” The amendment made all the difference in that case 
as infringement had been found and save the amendment, the patent would have 
been held invalid.  
Specialist Adjudicators 
In many cases the ambiguity of an expression is not through a lack of technical 
description but rather from a legal drafting perspective.  
In order to bridge the gap between technical expertise and legal expertise, the 
regulations should be amended so that patent attorneys are required to acquire legal 
qualifications.  
From the ranks of such people who possess both the technical skills and the legal 
interpretive expertise, specialist adjudicators may be appointed to the Federal 
Magistrates Court to deal specifically with patent matters. 
Presently, s198(2)(d) of the Act requires that the Commissioner may register a 
person as a patent attorney if, amongst other things, the person has the “prescribed 
qualifications”. The rules provide amongst other requirements that the applicant has 
  
 
a degree, diploma or post graduate diploma of an Australian tertiary institution in an 
approved course “in a branch of engineering or science”.88 
The Act also requires a period of prescribed employment as a technical assistant in a 
patent attorney’s practice. 
The issue is not whether that there is extensive training in drafting specifications and 
claims89 but rather that legal training would assist in anticipating difficulties, which 
may render some patents vulnerable to revocation. 
The course requirements in the prescribed subjects with respect to patents are 
limited to Patent Law and Legal Process (a subject concerned with the general legal 
structure of courts and legislation). I believe the interpretive skills, which an attorney 
obtains through legal training, differs from that in which legal documents are drawn 
from a science or engineering background. After all, lawyers interpret the 
specifications with the assistance of technical experts.  
This appears to be recognised in the United States. The American regulations 
governing the recognition of individuals to practice before the United States Patent 
Office in patent cases are set out in 37 CFR §§ 10.5, 10.6 and 10.7. These include a 
provision that any citizen of the United States who is an attorney and who fulfils the 
requirements set out in the regulations may be registered as a patent attorney.90 The 
regulations go on to say that the applicant must be “possessed of the legal, scientific, 
and technical qualifications necessary to enable him or her to render applicants for 
patent valuable service”91 
C O N C L U S I O N  T O  P A P E R  
The decisions show that it would be foolish for anyone to expect that they could 
advise in this area with any degree of predictability. It is equally difficult to determine 
from the cases whether the low statistics are attributable to a pro-competition policy 
of the Court. 
As stated by the Working Group:  
“It can be very difficult in such an area of law to assess whether 
the Courts are correctly applying the law, or whether in fact they 
are applying policy criteria and so making law every time they 
confront new facts and circumstances.” 92 
It is fitting that this paper ends on a positive note. Intellectual endeavour should be 
encouraged for the benefit of all Australians. Recently her Honour Kiefel J “ploughed 
  
 
through” a myriad of attacks on validity, including technical attacks under s40(2), fair 
basing under s40(3), novelty which involved ten alleged anticipations, prior use, false 
suggestion and obviousness to conclude there was infringement. Relevant to the 
decision was unconvincing evidence from the respondent’s expert witnesses.93  
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